THE CASE OF PAUL COOPER, TRIMET RAIL OPERATOR

Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 757,
Portland, OR

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March 24, 2010

Mr. Don Allison
Manager, TriMet Rail Operations
4012 SE 17th
Portland, OR 97202

Re:Evidence Uncovered at Step 3 Hearing on Paul Cooper Termination

Dear Mr. Allison,

I am taking the unusual step of appealing directly to you over the above matter. I do so because I believe that the evidence that was presented at the Step 3 hearing establishes beyond any doubt that the incident regarding the child on the platform was the result of equipment failure and not Mr. Cooper's deliberate actions. For example, some of the evidence that establishes Mr. Cooper's innocence includes:

1. TriMet video taped me performing a test on the same type of car. To refresh your memory, my test consisted of the following:
   I stood at the Passenger PEI Unit 1 and pushed the passenger emergency button in 3 times in rapid succession the way a frantic passenger might punch the button. The operator answered after only the last time. He said he only heard the last one - which is exactly what Mr. Cooper always claimed.
   I performed the same test a second time. Again, the operator said it only sounded once. This established there is no stacking of calls. Instead, the first time I pushed the button, it canceled the prior call. I confirmed with the operator that is how the system works. Joe Ruffin, a long time light rail mechanic was with me, and he confirmed all of the above.
2. We requested a download of the test I made. That test established that the download was in error. It shows I performed the test 3 times when I only performed it two times. Exhibit 1
3. The test also established that Mr. Cooper did not cancel the calls. This is seen by the download of car 407 which shows that unit 4 both initiated and dropped the call.Exhibit 2. This can be concluded by the Unit 4 designation in each dropped call. That sequence tracks exactly what Joe Ruffin and I witnessed and what operators tell us. If the passenger repeatedly pushed the button, he repeatedly cancelled his own call. You will note that the passenger claimed he had pushed the button at least ten times. Exhibit 3
4. Supervisor Jim Fowler met Mr. Coopers' train within a few hours of the incident. He found that the intercom system failed to work properly. His report states, "Even though the TOD screen showed the Intercom volume to be in the mid-range, you could still not hear the call inside the cab." Exhibit 4
5. We will be able to call a number of rail operators who will say they commonly carry duct tape to make emergency repairs and sign changes. The night of this incident, maintenance personnel discovered that the passenger intercom system and passenger buzzer alert on train 407 had both been disabled. At 4:53 a.m. the maintenance crew found that both the passenger emergency botton speaker and the passenger alert buzzer in train 407 had been disabled by a combination of paper towels and tape. Exhibit 5
6. The Type 4 train cars are new and have had multiple problems with the passenger communication systems. Train 407 had 3 repairs on its communication system between August 20th and November 16th when this incident occurred. Exhibit 6
7. Mr. Cooper was operating from the cab in train 407. The other train attached to 407 was 408. TriMet provided a readout of all communication system repairs on all Type 4s. It is very clear that train 407 and train 408 were both the "lemons" of the fleet when it came to communications.
   
8. If you look at the repair dates, you will note that TriMet has more than one defect report for the same defect. I counted up just the number of repair events. Thus,if there is one date but three reports, I counted only 1 report. Specifically the document shows that the following trains needed the following number of repairs to their communications system during the same time period:
   1 repairs - 401, 402, 403, 418, 419, 420-421
   2 repairs - 412,413, 417
   3 repairs - 405, 411
   4 repairs - 415, 416
   In contrast, compare that to the communications repairs made to the two cars that Mr. Cooper was operating the day of the incident:
   17 repairs - 407
   28 repairs - 408
   As you know, when these two "lemons" were coupled together, they became one intercom system. It is reasonable to think that any problems would also be shared. What you have heard and what Supervisor Fowler would testify to is that despite 407 being the "active" cab, the passenger alert system was sounding in cab 408 when he did his inspection shortly after the incident.Exhibit 7
   It is clear these two "lemons" were disasters waiting to happen. It was Mr. Cooper's misfortune to be the one who was operating them when disaster occurred.
9. TriMet's reaction to this incident was driven by the media's attention to it. I say that because there have been numerous incidents where trains have left the platforms and separated families or where it is alleged there was an emergency situation and the operator failed to respond to the call button - one the day before the incident involving Mr. Cooper. It is my understanding that none of the operators involved in these other incidents were disciplined (nor should they have been given the fallibility of the system.) Exhibit 8
10. You provided some policies regarding the Passenger intercom system ("SPOs") First, these SPOs had not been used to train these operators nor were they disseminated to operators. That said, Mr. Cooper could not be found to have violated these policies even had he seen them. Exhibit 9
11. I object to the cab consol photo that TriMet showed at the hearing. The TOD display screen was not functional in the cab on the day of the incident. This is clear from the fact that it did not show that the video camera in train 407 did not work. That failure was not displayed on the TOD display screen nor does that failure appear on the download. Like everything else on the Type 4s, the TOD fails. Therefore the photos are misleading. Exhibit 10

In light of the overwhelming and unrebutted evidence presented at the Step 3 hearing, we believe that TriMet should withdraw the termination of Paul Cooper. I look forward to receiving your response in the near future.

Very truly yours,

Sam Schwarz
Vice President - Assistant Business Representative